OWASP MCP Top 10 — Compliance Assessment

2025 · 2026-04-23 registry entry

Server
@takiguchi-yu/google-workspace-mcp-server (takiguchi-yu-google-workspace-mcp-server)
Scan id
5ebd257b-759e-40e1-b140-527d9b14c30a
Assessed at
2026-05-31 07:56:44 UTC
Sentinel version
0.4.0
DRAFT for review — not legal advice. See attestation block for verification instructions.

Executive summary

✗ Non-compliant

Assessment of @takiguchi-yu/google-workspace-mcp-server against OWASP MCP Top 10: overall status non compliant. Of 10 controls, 0 met, 2 unmet, 0 partial, 8 not assessed, 0 not applicable. 2 control(s) had complete mapped-assessor execution evidence; 8 lacked sufficient execution evidence and 0 were outside the current assessor mapping. Unmet controls have findings at or above the framework's mandatory severity threshold and should be remediated before relying on this server in a regulated deployment. All claims are traceable to individual finding rows via finding_id and to the governing rule via rule_id; the enclosing signed envelope commits MCP Sentinel to the exact bytes of this report.

Coverage & transparency

Coverage band
medium
Coverage ratio
66%
Rules version
2026-04-23

Analysis techniques applied:

  • ast-taint
  • composite
  • cross-module
  • dependency-audit
  • entropy
  • similarity
  • structural
  • stub

Controls (10)

IDControlStatusEvidence
MCP01 Prompt Injection ? Not assessed 0
MCP02 Tool Poisoning ✗ Unmet 1
MCP03 Command Injection ? Not assessed 0
MCP04 Data Exfiltration ? Not assessed 0
MCP05 Privilege Escalation ? Not assessed 0
MCP06 Excessive Permissions ? Not assessed 0
MCP07 Insecure Configuration ? Not assessed 0
MCP08 Dependency Vulnerabilities ? Not assessed 0
MCP09 Logging & Monitoring Failures ? Not assessed 0
MCP10 Supply Chain Compromise ✗ Unmet 1

Control details

MCP01 — Prompt Injection

? Not assessed

0/24 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; no adverse findings were observed, but the control is not assessed because execution evidence is incomplete. Unexecuted assessors: A1 (execution-ledger); A5 (execution-ledger); A7 (execution-ledger); A8 (execution-ledger); A9 (execution-ledger); B5 (execution-ledger); F1 (execution-ledger); F6 (execution-ledger); G1 (execution-ledger); G2 (execution-ledger); G3 (execution-ledger); G4 (execution-ledger); G5 (execution-ledger); H2 (execution-ledger); H3 (execution-ledger); I3 (execution-ledger); I6 (execution-ledger); I7 (execution-ledger); J3 (execution-ledger); J5 (execution-ledger); J6 (execution-ledger); N4 (execution-ledger); N9 (execution-ledger); N12 (execution-ledger).

Framework reference

Control text:

Attacker-controlled content delivered through MCP server descriptions, parameters, resources, prompts, or initialize metadata that hijacks agent reasoning. Includes direct and indirect injection.

MCP02 — Tool Poisoning

✗ Unmet

0/15 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; 1 finding(s) observed (1 critical); at least one finding is at or above the high threshold (status: unmet). 15 mapped assessor(s) did not execute, so this finding-backed result does not imply complete control coverage.

Framework reference

Control text:

Tools that misrepresent their behaviour through deceptive names, annotations, namespace squatting, homoglyphs, or time-based drift (rug pulls).

  • Critical Official Namespace Squatting (finding b168bb11-294a-4865-8465-ec4d89abb8b5, confidence 90%) SOURCE: external-content at initialize.server_name — The MCP client surfaces the server name verbatim in its approval dialog, and the LLM ingests the server name alongside the tool descriptions. A nam
Required mitigations
  • If you own the server and are NOT affiliated with the vendor whose namespace it contains, rename the server to remove the vendor token. Choose a name that makes your actual publisher identity clear. If you ARE a vendor-approved partner and intentionally use the vendor's namespace, request inclusion in the rule's OFFICIAL_NAMESPACES.verified_github_orgs list by publishing the server under a vendor-sanctioned GitHub organisation. Users deciding whether to approve the server should check the repository owner against the vendor's published list of approved partners before granting trust.

MCP03 — Command Injection

? Not assessed

0/6 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; no adverse findings were observed, but the control is not assessed because execution evidence is incomplete. Unexecuted assessors: C1 (execution-ledger); C9 (execution-ledger); C13 (execution-ledger); C16 (execution-ledger); J2 (execution-ledger); J7 (execution-ledger).

Framework reference

Control text:

Server code that executes shell commands, system calls, or git operations built from attacker-controlled input without sanitisation.

MCP04 — Data Exfiltration

? Not assessed

0/15 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; no adverse findings were observed, but the control is not assessed because execution evidence is incomplete. Unexecuted assessors: A3 (execution-ledger); F1 (execution-ledger); F3 (execution-ledger); F7 (execution-ledger); G7 (execution-ledger); I9 (execution-ledger); I13 (execution-ledger); K18 (execution-ledger); O4 (execution-ledger); O5 (execution-ledger); O6 (execution-ledger); O8 (execution-ledger); O9 (execution-ledger); O10 (execution-ledger); P3 (execution-ledger).

Framework reference

Control text:

Server features that permit sensitive data to leave the trust boundary via HTTP, DNS, headers, URIs, or covert channels.

MCP05 — Privilege Escalation

? Not assessed

0/7 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; no adverse findings were observed, but the control is not assessed because execution evidence is incomplete. Unexecuted assessors: C2 (execution-ledger); C8 (execution-ledger); C10 (execution-ledger); C12 (execution-ledger); I4 (execution-ledger); I12 (execution-ledger); J1 (execution-ledger).

Framework reference

Control text:

Vertical privilege increases via JWT confusion, deserialization, evaluation of untrusted input, OAuth scope widening, or capability escalation post-initialization.

MCP06 — Excessive Permissions

? Not assessed

0/7 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; no adverse findings were observed, but the control is not assessed because execution evidence is incomplete. Unexecuted assessors: A2 (execution-ledger); B3 (execution-ledger); B7 (execution-ledger); E4 (execution-ledger); F2 (execution-ledger); I11 (execution-ledger); I16 (execution-ledger).

Framework reference

Control text:

Tools or roots claiming broader filesystem, network, or credential access than required for their stated function.

MCP07 — Insecure Configuration

? Not assessed

0/11 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; no adverse findings were observed, but the control is not assessed because execution evidence is incomplete. Unexecuted assessors: B6 (execution-ledger); C7 (execution-ledger); C8 (execution-ledger); C11 (execution-ledger); C14 (execution-ledger); C15 (execution-ledger); D6 (execution-ledger); E1 (execution-ledger); E2 (execution-ledger); I15 (execution-ledger); J4 (execution-ledger).

Framework reference

Control text:

Servers shipped with insecure defaults: no authentication, wildcard CORS, HTTP transport, weak session tokens, disabled TLS validation, empty sandboxes.

MCP08 — Dependency Vulnerabilities

? Not assessed

0/7 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; no adverse findings were observed, but the control is not assessed because execution evidence is incomplete. Unexecuted assessors: D1 (execution-ledger); D2 (execution-ledger); D3 (execution-ledger); D4 (execution-ledger); D5 (execution-ledger); D6 (execution-ledger); D7 (execution-ledger).

Framework reference

Control text:

Known-CVE, abandoned, malicious, or typosquatted dependencies shipped with the server.

MCP09 — Logging & Monitoring Failures

? Not assessed

0/6 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; no adverse findings were observed, but the control is not assessed because execution evidence is incomplete. Unexecuted assessors: C6 (execution-ledger); E3 (execution-ledger); K1 (execution-ledger); K2 (execution-ledger); K3 (execution-ledger); K20 (execution-ledger).

Framework reference

Control text:

Absent, insufficient, or tamperable audit logging that prevents incident detection and response.

MCP10 — Supply Chain Compromise

✗ Unmet

0/27 mapped assessor rule(s) are proven to have executed; 1 finding(s) observed (1 critical); at least one finding is at or above the high threshold (status: unmet). 27 mapped assessor(s) did not execute, so this finding-backed result does not imply complete control coverage.

Framework reference

Control text:

Compromise of the build, publish, or distribution pipeline upstream of the server — including CI/CD token theft, build-artifact tampering, and manifest confusion.

  • Critical Official Namespace Squatting (finding b168bb11-294a-4865-8465-ec4d89abb8b5, confidence 90%) SOURCE: external-content at initialize.server_name — The MCP client surfaces the server name verbatim in its approval dialog, and the LLM ingests the server name alongside the tool descriptions. A nam
Required mitigations
  • If you own the server and are NOT affiliated with the vendor whose namespace it contains, rename the server to remove the vendor token. Choose a name that makes your actual publisher identity clear. If you ARE a vendor-approved partner and intentionally use the vendor's namespace, request inclusion in the rule's OFFICIAL_NAMESPACES.verified_github_orgs list by publishing the server under a vendor-sanctioned GitHub organisation. Users deciding whether to approve the server should check the repository owner against the vendor's published list of approved partners before granting trust.

Multi-step attack chains

No multi-step attack chains were synthesized for this server.

Cryptographic attestation

Algorithm
HMAC-SHA256
Key ID
mcps-hkdf-e8990a4e1526
Signer
mcp-sentinel/v1
Signed at
2026-05-31T07:56:44.334Z
Canonicalization
RFC8785

HMAC-SHA256 signature (base64, wrapped at 64 chars):

WqMnaJxQldQw9EfZ7qEUAA8ewhShxPrB/louojs7VuY=

Verification instructions:

To verify this report:
  1. Extract the report body (everything except the .attestation field).
  2. Canonicalize the body via RFC 8785 (JCS).
  3. Compute HMAC-SHA256 with the signing key for key_id "mcps-hkdf-e8990a4e1526".
  4. Base64-encode the result and compare with the signature above.