

# EU AI Act

Compliance assessment — 2024/1689

## Server: Google Classroom

Slug: google-classroom

Scan id: f5d0bb7c-4937-41d6-958a-96d071f7012b

Assessed at: 2026-05-24 07:20:00 UTC

Sentinel version: 0.4.0

Rules version: 2026-04-23

**Non-compliant**

**DRAFT for review — not legal advice. See attestation block for verification instructions.**

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### 1. Executive summary

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Assessment of Google Classroom against EU AI Act: overall status non compliant. Of 5 controls, 3 met, 2 unmet, 0 partial, 0 not applicable. 5 control(s) fell within MCP Sentinel's current assessor coverage; remaining control(s) are documented as not\_applicable until Phase 6 expands coverage. Unmet controls have findings at or above the framework's mandatory severity threshold and should be remediated before relying on this server in a regulated deployment. All claims are traceable to individual finding rows via finding\_id and to the governing rule via rule\_id; the enclosing signed envelope commits MCP Sentinel to the exact bytes of this report.

### 2. Coverage & transparency

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Coverage band: low

Coverage ratio: 40%

Rules version: 2026-04-23

Analysis techniques applied:

- ast-taint
- capability-graph
- entropy
- linguistic-scoring
- schema-inference

### 3. Controls summary

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ControlName

Status

Evidence

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Art.9Risk

Management

System' Unmet

1

Art.12Record-  
Keeping' Me@

Art.13  
Transparency  
& Provision of  
Information to  
Deployers'  
Unmet1  
Art.14Human  
Oversight' Met  
0  
Art.15  
Accuracy,  
Robustness,  
and  
Cybersecurity'  
Met0

## 4. Control details

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### Art.9 — Risk Management System

' Unmet

22 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; 1 finding(s) observed (1 high); at least one finding is at or above the high threshold (status: unmet).

#### Evidence:

[High] D3  
(finding bae5960  
d-6a38-4422-8a8  
7-04d8c94bebd8  
, confidence  
90%)

SOURCE: external-content at pypi:http@0.0.1-security — Dependency names are external content resolved from public package registries. A near-miss to a popular canonical name is a supply-chain anomaly

#### Required mitigations:

- Verify that the flagged dependency is the package you intended to install. Open the registry page for the candidate and compare publisher, publish date, download count, and postinstall scripts against the target. If it is not the intended package, replace it with the legitimate target, regenerate the lockfile, and audit the install environment (CI and developer machines) for any artifacts the malicious package may have written. Adopt a typosquat-aware package firewall (Socket.dev, Snyk Advisor, GitHub Dependabot) that rejects near-miss names at install time, in line with ISO 27001 A.5.21 supply-chain controls.

### Art.12 — Record-Keeping

' Met

5 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

### Art.13 — Transparency & Provision of Information to Deployers

' Unmet

14 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; 1 finding(s) observed (1 critical); at least one finding is at or above the high threshold (status: unmet).

#### Evidence:

[Critical] F5  
(finding  
742ed884-  
f261-4562-bcb2-  
2069442d387b,  
confidence 90%)

SOURCE: external-content at initialize.server\_name — The MCP client surfaces the server name verbatim in

its approval dialog, and the LLM ingests the server name alongside the tool descriptions. A nam

#### Required mitigations:

- If you own the server and are NOT affiliated with the vendor whose namespace it contains, rename the server to remove the vendor token. Choose a name that makes your actual publisher identity clear. If you ARE a vendor-approved partner and intentionally use the vendor's namespace, request inclusion in the rule's OFFICIAL\_NAMESPACES.verified\_github\_orgs list by publishing the server under a vendor-sanctioned GitHub organisation. Users deciding whether to approve the server should check the repository owner against the vendor's published list of approved partners before granting trust.

#### Art.14 — Human Oversight

13 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

Met

#### Art.15 — Accuracy, Robustness, and Cybersecurity

111 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

Met

## 5. Multi-step attack chains

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No multi-step attack chains were synthesized for this server.

## 6. Cryptographic attestation

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**Algorithm:** HMAC-SHA256

**Key ID:** mcp-sentinel-dev

**Signer:** mcp-sentinel/v1

**Signed at:** 2026-05-24  
T11:51:48.286Z

**Canonicalization:**  
RFC8785

#### HMAC-SHA256 signature (base64, wrapped at 64 chars):

+HZORCUT6eBLT9Aidt jB/GP3dDpk jBk jB9IvFD7C+8o=

#### Verification instructions:

To verify this report:

1. Extract the report body (everything except the .attestation field).
2. Canonicalize the body via RFC 8785 (JCS).
3. Compute HMAC-SHA256 with the signing key for key\_id "mcp-sentinel-dev".
4. Base64-encode the result and compare with the signature above.

