

# EU AI Act

Compliance assessment — 2024/1689

## Server: Brave Search (Cloudflare)

Slug: brave-search-cloudflare

Scan id: 4c92ad51-fa04-41a8-a97d-deba3784cd79

Assessed at: 2026-05-24 07:58:22 UTC

Sentinel version: 0.4.0

Rules version: 2026-04-23

**Non-compliant**

**DRAFT for review — not legal advice. See attestation block for verification instructions.**

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### 1. Executive summary

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Assessment of Brave Search (Cloudflare) against EU AI Act: overall status non compliant. Of 5 controls, 4 met, 1 unmet, 0 partial, 0 not applicable. 5 control(s) fell within MCP Sentinel's current assessor coverage; remaining control(s) are documented as not\_applicable until Phase 6 expands coverage. Unmet controls have findings at or above the framework's mandatory severity threshold and should be remediated before relying on this server in a regulated deployment. All claims are traceable to individual finding rows via finding\_id and to the governing rule via rule\_id; the enclosing signed envelope commits MCP Sentinel to the exact bytes of this report.

### 2. Coverage & transparency

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Coverage band: low

Coverage ratio: 40%

Rules version: 2026-04-23

Analysis techniques applied:

- ast-taint
- capability-graph
- entropy
- linguistic-scoring
- schema-inference

### 3. Controls summary

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ControlName

Status

Evidence

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Art.9Risk

Management

System' Me0

Art.12Record-

Keeping' Me0

Art.13  
Transparency  
& Provision of  
Information to  
Deployers'  
Unmet1  
Art.14Human  
Oversight' Met  
0  
Art.15  
Accuracy,  
Robustness,  
and  
Cybersecurity'  
Met0

## 4. Control details

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### Art.9 — Risk Management System

22 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

' Met

### Art.12 — Record-Keeping

5 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

' Met

### Art.13 — Transparency & Provision of Information to Deployers

14 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; 1 finding(s) observed (1 critical); at least one finding is at or above the high threshold (status: unmet).

' Unmet

#### Evidence:

[Critical] F5  
(finding  
83bbd8e1-a487-  
4de8-9971-0f0ff6  
60f538,  
confidence 90%)

SOURCE: external-content at initialize.server\_name — The MCP client surfaces the server name verbatim in its approval dialog, and the LLM ingests the server name alongside the tool descriptions. A nam

#### Required mitigations:

- If you own the server and are NOT affiliated with the vendor whose namespace it contains, rename the server to remove the vendor token. Choose a name that makes your actual publisher identity clear. If you ARE a vendor-approved partner and intentionally use the vendor's namespace, request inclusion in the rule's OFFICIAL\_NAMESPACES.verified\_github\_orgs list by publishing the server under a vendor-sanctioned GitHub organisation. Users deciding whether to approve the server should check the repository owner against the vendor's published list of approved partners before granting trust.

### Art.14 — Human Oversight

13 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

' Met

## Art.15 — Accuracy, Robustness, and Cybersecurity

111 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

Met

## 5. Multi-step attack chains

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No multi-step attack chains were synthesized for this server.

## 6. Cryptographic attestation

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**Algorithm:** HMAC-

SHA256

**Key ID:** mcp-sentinel-  
dev

**Signer:** mcp-sentinel/  
v1

**Signed at:** 2026-05-24  
T12:13:12.619Z

**Canonicalization:**  
RFC8785

**HMAC-SHA256 signature (base64, wrapped at 64 chars):**

ejjCeQoAWfIAiyPi9cmrrmIzy/Ly1/Jnkq3whEZc0Vw=

**Verification instructions:**

To verify this report:

1. Extract the report body (everything except the .attestation field).
2. Canonicalize the body via RFC 8785 (JCS).
3. Compute HMAC-SHA256 with the signing key for key\_id "mcp-sentinel-dev".
4. Base64-encode the result and compare with the signature above.

