

EU AI Act

Compliance assessment — 2024/1689

Server: Axion (Google Earth Engine)

Slug: axion-google-earth-engine

Scan id: dfd0d8ca-b715-4568-83f7-9a871f0d2015

Assessed at: 2026-05-24 07:17:58 UTC

Sentinel version: 0.4.0

Rules version: 2026-04-23

Non-compliant

DRAFT for review — not legal advice. See attestation block for verification instructions.

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1. Executive summary

Assessment of Axion (Google Earth Engine) against EU AI Act: overall status non compliant. Of 5 controls, 3 met, 2 unmet, 0 partial, 0 not applicable. 5 control(s) fell within MCP Sentinel's current assessor coverage; remaining control(s) are documented as not_applicable until Phase 6 expands coverage. Unmet controls have findings at or above the framework's mandatory severity threshold and should be remediated before relying on this server in a regulated deployment. All claims are traceable to individual finding rows via finding_id and to the governing rule via rule_id; the enclosing signed envelope commits MCP Sentinel to the exact bytes of this report.

2. Coverage & transparency

Coverage band: low

Coverage ratio: 40%

Rules version: 2026-04-23

Analysis techniques applied:

- ast-taint
- capability-graph
- entropy
- linguistic-scoring
- schema-inference

3. Controls summary

ControlName

Status

Evidence

Art.9Risk

Management

System' Unmet

3

Art.12Record-

Keeping' Me@

Art.13
Transparency
& Provision of
Information to
Deployers'
Unmet1
Art.14Human
Oversight' Met
0
Art.15
Accuracy,
Robustness,
and
Cybersecurity'
Met0

4. Control details

Art.9 — Risk Management System

' Unmet

22 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; 3 finding(s) observed (3 high); at least one finding is at or above the high threshold (status: unmet).

Evidence:

[High] D3
(finding 6f1cf963-
38ef-4ffc-afba-88
368e025894,
confidence 90%)

SOURCE: external-content at npm:redis@4.7.0 — Dependency names are external content resolved from public package registries. A near-miss to a popular canonical name is a supply-chain anomaly under ISO

[High] D3
(finding
6086b7c2-
e25f-41c1-a57f-
f79a10df7588,
confidence 88%)

SOURCE: external-content at pypi:yaml@2.8.1 — Dependency names are external content resolved from public package registries. A near-miss to a popular canonical name is a supply-chain anomaly under ISO

[High] D7
(finding 4656832
7-8883-4785-
a6ca-
f945d985da95,
confidence 70%)

SOURCE: external-content at npm:@types/geojson@7946.0.16 — Alex Birsan's 2021 dependency-confusion technique publishes public-registry packages with artificially-high version numbers under scoped name

Required mitigations:

- Verify that the flagged dependency is the package you intended to install. Open the registry page for the candidate and compare publisher, publish date, download count, and postinstall scripts against the target. If it is not the intended package, replace it with the legitimate target, regenerate the lockfile, and audit the install environment (CI and developer machines) for any artifacts the malicious package may have written. Adopt a typosquat-aware package firewall (Socket.dev, Snyk Advisor, GitHub Dependabot) that rejects near-miss names at install time, in line with ISO 27001 A.5.21 supply-chain controls.
- Verify the scoped package is resolved from the private registry, not the public one. Pin the scope in ``.npmrc` / `pip.conf` : `@your-scope:registry=https://your-private-registry` . If the installed version is a`

public-registry impostor, remove it immediately, audit the build environment for install-time artifacts, and rotate any secrets the build had access to. Publish placeholder packages to the public registry for every private scope to block future Birsan-style attacks.

Art.12 — Record-Keeping

Met

5 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

Art.13 — Transparency & Provision of Information to Deployers

Unmet

14 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; 1 finding(s) observed (1 critical); at least one finding is at or above the high threshold (status: unmet).

Evidence:

[Critical] F5
(finding 9bc4f4d1
-11fa-4d71-9533-
fb29eeaabe39,
confidence 90%)

SOURCE: external-content at initialize.server_name — The MCP client surfaces the server name verbatim in its approval dialog, and the LLM ingests the server name alongside the tool descriptions. A nam

Required mitigations:

- If you own the server and are NOT affiliated with the vendor whose namespace it contains, rename the server to remove the vendor token. Choose a name that makes your actual publisher identity clear. If you ARE a vendor-approved partner and intentionally use the vendor's namespace, request inclusion in the rule's OFFICIAL_NAMESPACES.verified_github_orgs list by publishing the server under a vendor-sanctioned GitHub organisation. Users deciding whether to approve the server should check the repository owner against the vendor's published list of approved partners before granting trust.

Art.14 — Human Oversight

Met

13 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

Art.15 — Accuracy, Robustness, and Cybersecurity

Met

111 assessor rule(s) evaluated this control; no findings observed.

5. Multi-step attack chains

No multi-step attack chains were synthesized for this server.

6. Cryptographic attestation

Algorithm: HMAC-
SHA256

Key ID: mcp-sentinel-
dev

Signer: mcp-sentinel/
v1

Signed at: 2026-05-24
T11:54:39.125Z

Canonicalization:
RFC8785

HMAC-SHA256 signature (base64, wrapped at 64 chars):

QHIkZYnrD34xTuJAR/bEjvqQMh+YcivgHeELMwFbT/c=

Verification instructions:

To verify this report:

1. Extract the report body (everything except the .attestation field).
2. Canonicalize the body via RFC 8785 (JCS).
3. Compute HMAC-SHA256 with the signing key for key_id "mcp-sentinel-dev".
4. Base64-encode the result and compare with the signature above.

